Abstract: Two claims pervade the literature on the political economy of market reforms: that economic crises cause reforms; and that crises matter because they bring into question the validity of the economic model held to be responsible for them. Economic crises are said to spur a process of learning that is conducive to the abandonment of failing models and to the adoption of successful models. But although these claims have become the conventional wisdom, they have been hardly tested empirically due to the lack of agreement on what constitutes a crisis and to difficulties in measuring learning from them. I propose a model of rational learning from experience and apply it to the decision to open the economy. Using data from 1964 through 1990, I show that learning from the 1982 debt crisis was relevant to the first wave of adoption of an export promotion strategy, but learning was conditional on the high variability of economic outcomes in countries that opened up to trade. Learning was also symbolic in that the sheer number of other countries that liberalized was a more important driver of others' decisions to follow suit.
Introduction
Do crises cause economic reform?
1 According to much of the literature on the topic, there is evidence that countries reform when confronted with adverse economic conditions. Recessions, hyperinflations, and big fiscal and external deficits are likely to open the door to reform by triggering particular mechanisms that remove obstacles and opposition to policy change (Nelson, 1990; Grindle and Thomas, 1991; Haggard and Kaufman, 1992; Bates and Krueger, 1993; Haggard and Webb, 1994; Nelson, 1994; Williamson and Haggard, 1994 ).Yet the so-called crisis hypothesis faces theoretical and empirical challenges.
Theoretically speaking, the hypothesis is considered by some to be tautological and unfalsifiable.
As Dani Rodrik (1996) put it, if a crisis is a case of extreme policy failure, there is nothing remarkable about policy reform following a crisis. It is as predictable as smoke following fire. Thus, there is nothing to explain. Other authors contend that there is something to explain if extreme economic hardship alone is conducive to reform. But why do economic conditions have to be not just bad but very bad for a government to undertake reforms?
In this paper, I focus on a particular mechanism linking very bad economic conditions to the probability of reform. According to some authors, a period of deep economic disarray leads to a reassessment of the mapping from policies to outcomes. Politicians hold particular beliefs that contain explanations of good and bad economic results. However, "every now and then, something happens that does not fit the previous image -something that shakes our Bayesian faith in what we used to think" (Harberger, in Tommasi and Velasco, 1995: 18) . A period of deep economic disarray is a good candidate for precipitating a loss of faith in the current economic model. Economic crises lead to reform because they question the validity of the economic model employed up to that moment. This is precisely the mechanism that I test here.
The "crisis hypothesis" faces important empirical challenges too. The most obvious is how to operationalize the notion of "crisis". It is striking that a hypothesis that constitutes the conventional wisdom in the policy reform literature has hardly been tested cross-nationally. Most evidence concerning this hypothesis is based on interesting case studies that offer useful but ultimately anecdotal evidence. Overall, as Drazen (2000) states, econometric studies that test it are just as rare. This paper contributes to filling the empirical gap.
I focus on the role that learning from the 1982 debt crisis played in the abandonment of the import substitution strategy of development (ISS) and the subsequent adoption by a good number of developing countries of an export promotion model (EO). I use rational updating to model learning. In particular, in a rational framework shocks are modeled as an increase in the uncertainty of the beliefs that politicians hold about expected outcomes. If governments hold very definite beliefs about what outcomes will follow particular policies, their incentives to scrutinize the evidence are minimal.
However, if crises increase politicians' uncertainty about what to expect from policies, then politicians will be more attentive to actual outcomes. In turn, if the results point overwhelmingly to the superiority of one of the policy strategies, a change in policy is predicted as long as politicians choose policies rationally. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that treats learning empirically in a crossnational setting as the mechanism that mediates between economic crises and policy reform.
According to the results, the 1982 debt shock and ensuing recession do explain the abandonment of the ISS and the decision to open up. Moreover, learning from this shock is somewhat relevant to explaining the policy switch, whereas simply learning from others' experience under alternative models of development is not. The increase in the uncertainty of policymakers' beliefs resulting from the 1982 debt shock made them more attentive to evidence that in turn pointed to the average superiority of EO over ISS. However, learning is only from the experience of the region a country belongs to. Also, average growth figures hide a very high variance in growth results under EO and IS, which reduced the probability of a quick switch. Moreover, not all of the learning was rational: symbolic imitation or herding on others' behavior was an important element of the decision to liberalize the trade regime.
These results constitute a novel contribution that meets the challenge of operationalizing, measuring, and testing the impact of learning across time and space.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I briefly review the literature on economic crises and economic reform, with especial reference to EO. Section 3 explains how crises can be modeled in a rational updating framework. In section 4, I discuss the empirical application of rational updating to cross-national data, the variables, and the results. I conclude in section 5.
Economic Crises and Economic Reforms
The crisis hypothesis comes in two versions. According to the first version, bad times (economically speaking) are a necessary condition for governments to launch economic reforms.
According to the second version, only very bad times induce reform. A good number of edited volumes that review the reform experience of many developing countries show that economic disarray is at a best a necessary condition for policy reform; but rarely is it a sufficient one. A crisis may trigger the sense that something needs to be done. Yet taking action depends on whether policymakers have the political capacity to do so. In turn, political capacity relates to the type of political regime. If the regime is a dictatorship, political opposition to reforms can be repressed and institutions more easily circumvented. If the regime is a democracy, political capacity depends on the size of the political mandate and the ability of the incumbent party to assembly a coalition in favor of reform (Williamson, 1990; Haggard and Kauffman, 1992; Nelson, 1990 Nelson, , 1994 Keeler, 1993) .
As mentioned in the introduction, the first version of the crisis hypothesis has been considered to be, in general, uninteresting. Yet some scholars consider that the second version of the crisis hypothesisthat countries have to be in deep trouble to reform -contains an interesting puzzle. However, solving the puzzle requires some consensus on what constitutes very bad economic conditions as opposed to just bad economic conditions.
The few authors who have addressed this issue operationalize a crisis as deterioration of some economic variable above or below a particular threshold or against some previous figure. For example, according to Tornell (1998) , a crisis exists if a country's inflation rate is 40% or more and it has increased by 125% or more from the previous year. Tornell also considers a decline of GDP per capita by more than 18% relative to the previous year as an indicator of crisis. Another relevant macroeconomic variable is the balance of payments. In this case, an economic crisis is deemed to exist if a country's level of international reserves is less than the equivalent of three months' worth of imports. Alternative operationalizations can be found in Drazen and Easterly (2001) . These authors look at inflation, the black market premium, the growth rate of GDP per capita, the current account deficit, and the public sector deficit. These indicators are roughly similar to those used by Lora (2000) in his study of economic reform in Latin America. Finally, another very used indicator of crisis has to do with abnormally strong market pressures for currency depreciation (Leblang, 2003) .
By which mechanisms can deep economic crises facilitate reform? The answers to this question are closely related to the parallel studies on inaction and delay of reforms (see Drazen, 2000 , for a summary).
In these studies, the basic idea is that vested interests block policy change. Yet, if the status quo deteriorates to the point where it is obvious that everybody loses if it is perpetuated, then reform is possible. An alternative view of inaction emphasizes that policy reform may be blocked due to ex ante uncertainty about who the winners and who the losers will be in the post-reform scenario (Fernández and Rodrik, 1991) . But again, in the midst of deep and persistent economic trouble (for instance, in a hyperinflation), it is certain that everybody loses if stabilization is not undertaken. Thus, deep crises increase state autonomy. All these plausible arguments have been formalized but they have been rarely tested (see Tornell, 1998 for an exception, and Lora, 2000 for a discussion on the mismatch between theory and data). Note that these approaches to the study of the impact of bad economic conditions on the probability of reform link crises with an increased capacity for action. Tommasi and Velasco (1995) put it, crises lead to a realization of how costly some previous policies were and to a reassessment of the economic ideas that connect policies to outcomes. Politicians' beliefs about the "right" model of the world do not change frequently. Yet a deep economic crisis can alter those beliefs, leading to a process of social learning (Kahler, 1990; .
The empirical tests of the impact of crises on a wide range of economic policies provide results as diverse as the definitions of crises. Drazen and Easterly (2001) report that hyperinflation and extreme values of the black market premium are indeed followed by reforms. 3 Lora (2000) finds that a falling per capita income is the best predictor of his index of reform (which includes privatization, trade, financial, tax, and labor reforms). He also reports that, in particular for trade reform, the best proxy of crisis is the rate of decline of GDP. Both effects are small in magnitude, though. On the other hand, Milner and Kubota (2005) find no significant impact of falls in GDP per capita, inflation, or the balance of payments on the probability of trade liberalization. Overall, it is hard to compare these results or to draw any clear conclusions from them: not only do the definitions of crises vary but the measures of trade and financial liberalization, the samples, and the periods are not comparable.
2 An alternative perspective linking very bad economic conditions with increased probability of reform is based on the postulates of prospect theory (Weyland, 1996) . According to this cognitive approach to decision making, politicians and the public have different attitudes toward risk depending on whether they are in the so-called domain of gains or domain of losses. A very deep economic crisis places politicians and the public in the domain of big losses, which in turn induces them to take the risk of launching reforms. Reforms are considered to be a risky choice for politicians given the anticipated unpopularity of austerity policies. However, reforms have been sometimes accompanied by boosts in politicians' popularity, not the opposite (Stokes, 2001) . 3 The authors suggest that public sector deficits and bad external accounts attract foreign aid rather than spurring reform. Under ISS, countries like Brazil and Mexico achieved high rates through the mid 1960s. After that, chronic balance of payments crises, increasing public deficits financed by creating new money or recourse to external indebtedness, subsequent inflation, and rent-seeking led to the belief that ISS had outlived its initial purposes. This perception was accentuated by the parallel experience of the East Asian Tigers. Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan grew at impressive rates while Latin America stagnated. The success of the former was attributed to the adoption of a strategy of export promotion, in turn inspired by the Japanese experience. EO -accompanied by selective interventionpromoted growth, even during periods of economic hardship.
Economic Crises and Development Strategies
The evidence was not ignored in policy circles. Enrique Iglesias, former president of the InterAmerican Development Bank, contended that "the ideas developed in the North during the Reagan-Thatcher era were very important in Latin America, but the Chilean experience was far more significant in so far as it provided a viable model. The success of the Chilean experience was very much noted by other regional leaders" (quoted in Williamson, 1994: 493-494) . Miguel A. Rodríguez, president of the Venezuelan central bank, stated that "economists and policy makers in Latin America saw the percapita income growth of the Asian countries over the past twenty years and become more and more convinced that the opening of the economy was the best way to produce a real transformation in Latin American societies" (quoted in Williamson, 1994: 377) . Arriagada and Graham (1994: 282) contended that, in Chile, which is considered to be the Latin American tiger, short-term populist strategies were discredited by "the chaos in neighboring countries, [which] made macroeconomic restraint much more politically palatable." According to Jadish Bhagwati (1985: 41) "[m] any developing countries learned the hard way by following IS [import substitution] policies too long and seeing the fortunate few pursuing the EP strategy [export promotion] to do much better. Perhaps learning by others doing and one's undoing is the most common form of education." Based on the contrasting experiences of Latin American and East Asian countries, EO became the accepted orthodoxy and with it the misleading idea that the state is a drag on economic development (Sachs, 1985; Wade, 1990; Westphal, 1990; Rodrik, 1996; . 4 Thus, the debt crisis opened a debate about alternative development strategies, as a result of which EO was actively promoted by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and launched in many developing countries. 4 It is undeniable that the East Asian countries performed remarkably well. But the extent to which this performance can be exclusively attributed to reliance on export promotion is uncertain. Country stories show that EO was adopted amidst a very particular constellation of historical, social and political factors. A closer look at countries' experiences reveals that the story of the East Asian miracle was simplified in several aspects. For instance, the ex post reading of the East Asian success as primarily the result of the withdrawal of the state overlooks the fact that there are different types of state in terms of size, strength and autonomy, as well as different forms of state intervention. The experience of South Korea with selective intervention and infant industry promotion shows that reducing the bias of the regime may require active state involvement, not the opposite. The most recent cases of India and China also reveal that the best development strategy is one in which export promotion is combined with temporary import protection and considerable doses of state control of the opening process. It is true that the Latin American experience showed that state failures could be disastrous; but the East Asian experience does not establish that markets alone are enough to succeed. Yet in policy circles success was interpreted as clear evidence of the virtues of the market, in contrast to the failures of the state. Accordingly, policy recommendations of neutral development regimes came with broader recommendations to dismantle state intervention. This has been an unfortunate confusion, for it is one thing to promote exports, which was crucial for the East Asian success, and a very different thing to advocate a minimal role for the state, which was not.
Evaluating the results of these alternative development strategies is complicated by the fact that good measures of them, with their many dimensions -average tariffs and their dispersion, quantitative restrictions, export subsidies, tax credits, degree of exchange rate overvaluation -are rarely available in a systematic and comparable way. Also, one has to decide what specific outcome may be relevant for politicians who want to learn about the consequences of alternative development strategies. I will take growth to be the outcome of interest for policymakers (Bresser et al., 1993) . 5 In Stiglitz's view, "(…) there is by and large a consensus among economists -based on a wealth of studies -that trade liberalization brings significant economic gains (…)" (1998: 35).
However, the empirical evidence on the relationship between openness and growth in developing countries is positive (Wacziarg and Welch, 2003) but weak (Frankel and Romer, 1999) . Moreover, a thorough review of recent literature by Rodríguez and Rodrik (1999) Figure 1 shows the average rates of growth in the sample for the period of study under one and the other development strategy. As it is possible to see, on average countries under an EO development strategy performed better than countries under an ISS throughout the period. In particular, for the purpose of this paper, it is interesting to emphasize that the average rates of growth of countries under EO during the period following the 1982 debt crisis were better on average than the rates of growth of those countries under ISS. The average rates of growth under ISS reached their trough in 1984, that is, two years after the debt crisis broke. Actually, it is important to stress that some countries' initial response to the crisis was to increase protection. The governments of Brazil, Peru and Argentina adopted heterodox stabilization policies that soon collapsed, contributing to the learning process about the failure of excessively interventionist policies (Edwards, 1995: 41-59 ). In the database, overall rates of growth were 1.18% for the 957 country-years under ISS and 3.13% for the 384 country years under EO. It is true that rates of growth were on average higher under EO than under ISS, as Figure 1 shows. However, it is important to stress that the good performance under EO seems to have been exclusively an East Asian phenomenon. In this region, even under ISS, rates of growth were remarkable. Moreover, the growth figures were outstanding in the region also in the crisis period 1974-85. But a comparison with outcomes outside East Asia suggests that high growth was rather specific to this particular location.
This fact is important to understand the results below. Grouth unther EP 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 3. Learning, Shocks, and Policy Reform I first describe the use of rational updating to model learning. I also explain how an economic shock can be modeled in a rational updating framework. I then sketch the relationship between learning from shocks and subsequent policy choices. I will keep the technicalities at a minimum, since I have explained them elsewhere (Meseguer, 2006a; 2006b) . Instead, I will rely on concepts, intuition and an illustration to explain the basics of this approach. 8 Learning is an intuitive and simple concept, yet one that is hard to operationalize. The basic idea is that policymakers have prior beliefs about the economic outcomes that will follow the adoption of a particular policy. The world is an excellent laboratory that provides politicians with information about how the policy in question has performed elsewhere. Politicians can learn from that experience, updating their beliefs about the efficacy of a policy after seeing its performance.
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Learning requires that politicians hold prior beliefs with some uncertainty. If governments do hold very certain beliefs about what the results of implementing a particular policy will be, then they will ignore the available information since they do not need it. On the other hand, if politicians prefer a policy but are very uncertain about its possible performance, they have a significant incentive to pay attention to what the available experience of that particular policy in the past or in other countries can reveal. Thus, the first prerequisite for learning to take place is that prior beliefs entail some uncertainty. The typical way to model prior beliefs is by means of a probability distribution in which an expected average rate of growth under, for example, ISS is attributed a particular variance-i.e., uncertainty. By definition, if governments are dogmatic, that is, if they hold beliefs with no uncertainty, they will not learn.
The available evidence, however, also matters. Two aspects of it in particular will determine the extent to which what you see will eventually prevail over what you initially believe. Imagine that a politician holds very uncertain beliefs about whether her country will experience a boom following the adoption of an export promotion strategy. However, the experience of many countries shows that export promotion is conducive to high rates of growth. Thus, the quantity and quality of the available information matter. The latter will be most useful when it is abundant (many countries) and when it is consistent (all of them growing). If the evidence is not abundant or is noisy or both, there will be little to learn from it. A scenario of "maximum learning" entails (1) politicians holding very uncertain prior beliefs about outcomes of policies and (2) abundant and consistent evidence concerning the outcomes of a policy. In this scenario, Bayesian updating yields a very powerful result: politicians will converge in their posterior beliefs (beliefs updated with the available information) regardless of their initial priors.
This result is very important since it means that one of the main criticisms of Bayesians -namely, that the choice of priors drives their results -does not hold if evidence is abundant. Note also that, if the choice of policies is driven by politicians' posterior beliefs, then convergence will be not only in posterior beliefs but also in policy choices. The distinction between rational learning and rational choice is important and hopefully will be clear from the illustration below. It means that, within the framework I aim to test, not only do politicians have to be rational learners but they also have to make rational choices in order to see convergence in policy choices. An illustration to make the above concepts intuitive follows. Note that the illustration has not been chosen for theoretical purposes, but for the purpose of clarifying the methodology. 
Figure 2: Average Region Rates of Growth in Latin America (1964-1990)
It is known that policy regime switches are rare and that policy persistence is more the rule than the exception. Therefore, the comparison of observed rates of growth under alternative policies seems not to be a good characterization of the policy choice process. The latter better fits a pattern of change, continuity, and change rather than of frequent switches.
Does the comparison of posterior beliefs about growth after observing the world provide a more realistic portrait of policy choices than the comparison of observed growth? In a rational framework, the observed outcomes are used as the basis for sequential updating. The updating starts with an expectation of growth following alternative policies and a variance attached to that expectation (prior beliefs). I modeled prior beliefs using average growth figures and the variance of results in the world under one and the other development strategy as observed in the world the year before a country's entrance in the database. Governments update this expectation after observing the average rate of growth of the countries that implemented, say, ISS in the region (available experience). As equation (1) shows, the posterior beliefs about expected growth (µ t ) are a compromise between the prior beliefs (µ t-1 ) and the average observed growth (X 1 ) for each point in time. The weight given to the observed experience is positively related to the size of the observed sample (n). The parameter t t is the posterior for the factor that relates the prior beliefs about the variance of the results and the observed variance.
This updating process takes place year after year, with the posterior beliefs of one year being the prior beliefs of the following one. As explained above, average rates of growth as well as the variance of -4 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 results matter. Thus, the posterior beliefs about the variability of results are also updated. For each country i the posterior beliefs about growth and its variability take the following form:
Year
S i, t is the posterior for the sum of squares 9
, and u i, t is the posterior for the degrees of freedom. A very important piece of information in equation (1) is the rate of adaptation to new data (1-ρ). The closer this rate is to 1, the greater the weight given to actual rates of growth as opposed to the prior beliefs about growth in the formation of posteriors. As Figure 3 shows, if initial prior beliefs are vague, the rate of adaptation to new data goes to 0 very fast (black line). Such a property entails that learning takes place swiftly at the beginning of the time series. Later in the updating process, new information has much less impact on the formation of posterior beliefs. In other words, beliefs tend to endure. This feature poses a legitimate question: does such a low receptivity to new information make rational updating useful in predicting policy switches?
In some forecasting models, the shape of the rate of adaptation to new data is altered with an "intervention" (West and Harrison, 1997) . The intervention allows the incorporation in the updating process of external information -for instance, a shock -that carries with it a high level of uncertainty.
Modeling the uncertainty attached to a shock -attributing a greater uncertainty (variance) to politicians' beliefs -makes the decision-maker automatically more attentive to observed results (grey line). Thus, the two lines overlap but diverge in 1983 after the intervention is modeled for the priors that year. The intervention was introduced in 1983 under the assumption that the growth consequences of the shock are felt with a lag. 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 From a substantive point of view, modeling the shock makes perfect sense. Policymaking occurs mostly according to a pattern of continuity in which mild ups and downs in outcomes do not bring into question the validity of the economic model. However, an external shock -like the one that happened in 1982 -that deeply affected the performance of the economy increases dramatically the uncertainty about the "correct" economic model. Reasonably, this increased uncertainty makes policymakers more attentive to the information that actual outcomes could reveal about the performance of alternative policies. Finally, Figure 5 compares the posterior beliefs about growth under ISS and under EO when an intervention is modeled in 1983 in the updating of the both series. A comparison with its "sister" Figure   2 shows that both series of posterior beliefs are smoother than the original ones, which is consistent with the observation that beliefs tend to endure. However, after conditioning on the actual data and the economic shock, the actual rates of growth under both policy alternatives greatly affect the formation of the posterior beliefs, which match closely the observed rates of growth. As a result of modeling this intervention, the switch to EO in the mid-1980s is anticipated. Note that at least in Latin America -but 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 not in the whole sample, as I showed above -countries under EO experienced a deeper yet shorter recession than the countries under ISS following the 1982 crisis. Importantly, the posterior series accounts for the faster recovery of those countries in the region under an EO development strategy.
Figure 5: Posterior Beliefs based on Regional Experience after Modeling the shock, Export Promotion and Import Substitution, Latin America
It is very important to make clear that this operationalization of learning from shocks does not entail that politicians will switch trade policy regimes. Policymakers may be rational learners and yet they may not choose policies rationally for a host of political reasons (strong interests or institutions that oppose; strong public opinion against reforms, and so on and so forth). Thus, rational choices do not automatically follow rational learning. Moreover, policymakers may be rational learners, and yet the evidence may be so confusing that, even if one is a rational learner and makes rational choices, a change of policy may not be justified on the basis of experience alone. If the evidence is confusing, it may be perfectly rational not to switch policies. I emphasize this point to make clear that by making governments more attentive to actual performance by modeling an intervention I am not artificially "forcing" them to change the course of their policies. In other words, interventions are not a post hoc strategy to accommodate reality.
Model and Results
I present the results of several explanatory models of the decision to adopt EO. The explanatory variables are (a) the difference in posterior beliefs about growth and (b) its volatility under and not under an EO strategy -calculated as just illustrated. These are the proxies for LEARNING. I enquire whether learning from others as opposed to learning from others and learning from the 1982 shock did affect the decision to adopt those policies. I control for other alternative explanations of policy choices and for domestic factors that might have affected decisions regarding the development strategy. Table 1 shows the dynamic probit estimations of the probability of switching to EO. The dependent variable is dichotomous, taking the value of 1 for the countries and years under an EO
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Posterior 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 -8 -6 strategy. The dynamic probit model assumes temporal dependency in the dependent variable and gives estimates of the probability of adopting these policies and of remaining under them. 10 Given data constraints, I report only the estimations concerning the probability of adopting these policies. 11 The list of variables used in the study, descriptive statistics, and countries are reported in Appendixes A and B.
I use three different model specifications. The first one includes LEARNING VARIABLES, which were calculated using rational updating. I calculated several series of posterior beliefs about growth under EO and ISS. Since both pieces of information are likely to affect the decision to switch policies, the posterior beliefs are about average results and about the variability of results under both development strategies. I structured the available information in three geographic groups: own past experience under alternative policies, experience in the region under alternative policies, and experience in the world (excluding own and regional experience). 12 The justification for this structuring of information at three levels is that the informative value of particular experiences increases with historical, cultural, and institutional similarities.
It seems reasonable to hypothesize that politicians learn somewhat selectively on the basis of geographic propinquity or linguistic, historical, and cultural similarities (Robinson, 1998; Hacking, 1997; Weyland, 2005; Simmons and Elkins, 2004) . For instance, Enrique Iglesias, former president of the Inter-American Development Bank, contended that "the ideas developed in the North during the Reagan-Thatcher era were very important in Latin America, but the Chilean experience was far more significant in so far as it provided a viable model. The success of the Chilean experience was very much noted by other regional leaders" (quoted in Williamson, 1994: 493-494 ).
The learning variables are the difference in posterior beliefs about growth under EO with respect to ISS, and the difference in posterior beliefs about variance of results under EO with respect to ISS. I expect the probability of adopting EO to be positively related to this difference in posterior beliefs about average growth results. However, how the variance of results affects the probability of a switch in policies depends on governments' attitudes toward risk. If governments are risk averse, the probability of switching to a particular policy will be inversely related to the posterior beliefs about the variance of results. But if governments are risk prone and feel seduced by some outstanding policy experience that, however, has been disastrous elsewhere, then we could find a positive relationship between a high variability of results and the probability of adopting a policy. The empirical test will inform us about governments' attitudes toward risk.
The second specification adds two additional mechanisms whereby export orientation may have spread. On the one hand, governments may have emulated each other without actually learning from each other. Emulation, unlike learning, does not imply a reassessment of causal maps that link policies to outcomes. Thus, emulation does not entail an improved understanding of cause-and-effect relations (May, 1992: 333; Meseguer, 2005) . Another difference is that learning is a purposive search for information: a problem is in place and a solution is sought. However, governments may want to imitate the policies carried out elsewhere for a host of reasons other than problem solving. Credibility and reputation are among them (Weyland, 2005) . Governments may copy the policies implemented by countries acclaimed as successful in an attempt to win international favor. In turn, signals of commitment to "good policies" may be a requisite for access to scarce external financial resources. Finally, policies that are carried out by a 10 See Amemiya (1985) . For applications, see Vreeland (2003) . 11 Due to the very low number of transitions to import substitution, the estimates of continuity were not reliable for this policy illustration. 12 The regions are Latin America, Africa, South Asia and South East Asia. I excluded South Asia from the final estimations given that the experience of EO in the region was minimal for the period under study. This means that the influence of prior beliefs would not vanish during the updating process, thus driving the posteriors. For the same reason, the coefficients concerning "own experience" should be treated with great caution.
majority of other governments are easier to justify domestically, especially when those policies are unpopular (Ikenberry, 1990; Bagheri and Habibi, 1998; Vreeland, 2003) . Emulation entails that governments adopt policies because they see many other countries adopting that policy, which in turn is often interpreted as acceptance of the policy as "good" (Broz, 2002) . I operationalize EMULATION as the sheer number of other countries contemporaneously under an EO strategy. I anticipate a positive relationship between seeing many others with a policy and adopting it.
The second diffusion mechanism I explore is outright coercion by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF exchanges loans for policies. It advocates export promotion including this policy among the conditions for receiving the Fund's money. Whether the IMF is persuading or coercing is not clear, though. For some authors, the availability of external funding delays the adoption of reforms unless the funding is conditional (Lora, 2000; Drazen and Easterly, 2001 ). Many others consider politicians' room for maneuver to be greater than a hypothesis of coercion may lead one to think (Nelson, 1990; Kahler, 1992; Stallings, 1992; Haggard and Webb, 1994; Weyland, 2005) . According to a number of scholars, IFIs teach and persuade instead of coercing. What appears as imposition may actually be a case of "technocratic alignment", that is, a coincidence of interests between IFIs and local policymaking cadres socialized in the same set of ideas (Nelson, 1990; Stallings, 1992; Kahler, 1992; Haggard and Webb, 1994) . As is standard in international political economy research, I operationalize coercion through a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a particular country in a particular year is under an IMF agreement. I expect the presence of an IMF agreement to be positively related to the probability of switching to EO.
The third specification accounts for the possible impact of the 1982 shock on learning and on policy choices. Thus, this specification is the crucial one for the argument that is being tested in this paper. It includes other control variables and the intervention to account for the 1982 crisis. The posterior belief series were calculated by introducing an intervention in the year after the crisis as just explained. The prior beliefs for this year were specified as high uncertainty priors, which dramatically increased the rate of adaptation to observed data. The intervention makes the posterior beliefs match closely the observed results.
I also controlled for the size of the country (SIZE), the political regime using two alternative operationalizations in different models -a dichotomous (REGIME) and a categorical measure of democracy (POLITY)-, the holding of elections (LAGGED ELECTIONS), and membership in GATT/WTO. Small countries are expected to be more open. In developing countries, democratization entailed enfranchising labor. Labor is the abundant factor in these countries and, according to the Stolper-Samuelson predictions, labor is the main beneficiary of opening to trade (Milner and Kubota, 2005) . Thus, a positive relationship is anticipated between democracy and trade opening. Governments are expected to introduce reforms immediately after elections to take advantage of honeymoon periods.
Finally, membership in GATT is expected to have a positive impact on the probability of opening.
Results are reported in Table 1 . Learning from economic shocks or, in other words, increased uncertainty about the validity of the alternative models of development was somewhat relevant to explaining the adoption of EO (model (3)). Learning from the experience of others only could not explain the decision to open. In fact, the baseline model of learning without modeling shocks (model (1))
shows that policymakers maintained a persistent risk-averse attitude in view of the available experience and this regardless of the level of analysis-own, region, world. The risk aversion is robust across specifications.
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; t-tests in parentheses; all variables are lagged one year. CONSTANT --2 2. .9 91 1* ** ** * (-4.12) --4 4. .6 62 2* ** ** * ( (--4 4. .9 99 9) ) --6 6. .1 15 5* ** ** * (-3.32) It is also important to emphasize that the two alternative mechanisms of policy convergence that I considered (EMULATION and COERCION) were positively related to the probability of adopting EO.
LEARNING FROM OWN EXPERIENCE
Countries under IMF agreements were more likely to adopt export promotion, although the marginal effect of this variable is low (3% more likely to liberalize when under an IMF agreement). This result backs the view of those who argue that national governments do have considerable room of maneuver.
Also, it seems that countries adopted EO because many others adopted it too, which confirms that "the rush to free trade" had a lot to do with herding on the behavior of others. 14 A one standard deviation variation in the variable EMULATION increases the probability of adopting EO in about 4%. Somewhat surprisingly, none of the domestic controls I included turned out to be significant, although SIZE, GATT, and LAGGED ELECTION showed the expected sign. None of the indicators of political regime turned out to be significant either. For want of more refined domestic operationalizations, the adoption of EO appears internationally driven.
Overall, the story of the switch to more open trade regimes after the 1982 shock as modeled is one of positive but somewhat weak rational learning from the own experience but also negative and stronger learning in view of the important variation in observed outcomes under alternative strategies in the region and elsewhere. Emulating others was an important reason to liberalize. Thus, these results confirm the common wisdom that links learning from the 1982 shock to the later decision on opening only in part and in a way that contradicts the common wisdom: rational learning appears more influential in having prevented a quick switch to EO despite knowledge of the virtues of this development strategy before the 1982 shock.
Conclusion
In this paper, I systematically explored the role that learning from economic shocks as opposed to learning from others during normal times played in one policy decision: adopting export promotion.
By so doing, I put to the test the widespread view that learning from policy mistakes and successes triggered a process of learning that in turn led to the abandonment of statist policies and to the adoption of liberal economic policies. A deep economic crisis questions the validity of the economic model seen as responsible for it. It draws politicians' attention to what works as opposed to what has failed, and increases politicians' uncertainty about the outcomes of policies.
13 I focus on variation in the world because simulated probabilities for variation in the region were often not significant. 14 The expression "rush to free trade" is due to Rodrik. See Guisinguer (2005) for an alternative explanation of trade liberalization based on the pressures of competition.
In the case of development strategies, the 1982 debt shock was diagnosed as the result of the wrong (interventionist) policies. At the same time as much of the developing world was experiencing a deep recession, East Asian countries muddled through the crisis quickly and without experiencing as much economic disarray. All the elements that spur learning were there: a theoretical diagnosis of failure, a theoretical diagnosis of success, and evidence of the superiority of one policy to another.
Learning from the 1982 shock appears consequential for the switch toward more openness. The paper showed that the anecdotal accounts of learning do withstand more systematic scrutiny and that particularly the experience of the region and the sheer numbers of others liberalizing, interpreted as symbolic emulation, had a positive impact on the probability of opening the trade regime. However, outstanding average figures quite often masked great variation in performance. This variation as observed in the world translated into negative learning that could explain why politicians did not jump on the reform bandwagon as fast as one could have expected from the "official" readings of EO versus ISS. None of the domestic political and economic variables I employed turned out to be significant. This paper presented a first attempt to systematically test two related pieces of conventional wisdom: that shocks cause reform and that they do so because crises spur a process of learning. Overall, the learning process seems to have been relevant but not independently of the empirical consistency that existed regarding policy failures and policy successes and of the general positive mood in favor of greater openness, as the evidence above showed. 
